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Contextual Effects on Explicature: Optional Pragmatics or Optional Syntax?   
 
Abstract 
The debate between advocates of free pragmatic enrichment and those who maintain 
that any pragmatic contribution to explicature is mediated by a covert linguistic 
indexical took a new turn with the claim that these covert elements may be optional 
(Martí 2006). This prompted the conclusion (Recanati 2010b) that there is no longer 
any issue of substance between the two positions, as both involve optional elements of 
utterance meaning, albeit registered at different representational levels (conceptual or 
linguistic). We maintain, on the contrary, that the issue remains substantive and we 
make the case that, for a theory of the processes involved in utterance comprehension, 
the free pragmatic enrichment account is indispensable. We further argue that the 
criticism of free enrichment that motivates at least some indexicalist accounts rests on 
a mistaken assumption that it is the semantic component of the grammar (linguistic 
competence) that is responsible for delivering truth-conditional content (explicature). 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The idea that a pragmatic process of ‘free’ enrichment can contribute  linguistically 
unarticulated constituents of content to the explicature (the intuitive truth-conditional 
content) of an utterance has been criticised as hopelessly unconstrained and unsystematic 
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(Stanley 2002, 2007; Martí 2006; Elbourne 2008; Szabó 2011). These critics claim, 
instead, that, whenever and wherever a pragmatic process supplies content to the 
explicature, there is an indexical element (either overt or covert) in the logical form of the 
utterance. For example, if the explicature of a particular utterance of the sentence ‘It is 
raining’ includes a locative constituent, such as IN LONDON, there must be a covert location 
variable in the logical form of the sentence. The idea is that this ensures that the recovery 
of explicature can be explained in the desired systematic fashion because the linguistic 
system indicates where  a pragmatic process (of saturation) is to take place. However, a 
problem for this indexicalist position is that there is a striking asymmetry between the 
behaviour of overt linguistic indexicals (e.g. ‘she’, ‘there’, ‘this’), which must be saturated 
(given contextual values), and their (alleged) covert counterparts, which need not always 
be saturated. It has been proposed that the problem can be solved by making covert 
indexicals optional (Martí 2006), a move that ensures both that any pragmatic effects on 
explicature are linguistically mandated and that covert variables behave the same way as 
overt ones. This development in the indexicalist account has prompted the conclusion that 
there is no longer any issue of substance between the two positions (pragmaticist and 
indexicalist), in that both now involve optional elements of utterance meaning (Recanati 
2010b).  
 The main aims of this paper are to show that, in fact, the issue remains a 
substantive one and to make the case that, for a theory of the processes involved in 
utterance comprehension, the free pragmatic enrichment account is indispensable and 
covert indexicals are redundant.  Our argument here turns on facts about on-line utterance 
processing, so even if it is a sound argument, a possible rejoinder from the indexicalist 
camp is that optional covert indexicals, nevertheless, have a role to play in a model of 
linguistic competence (knowledge). This position seems to be taken by Martí (2006), 
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whose criticism of ‘free enrichment’ and accompanying advocacy of optional covert 
indexicals rests on the assumption that the constituents of utterance meaning at issue are 
derived by the ‘semantic component’ of the modular (context-independent) language 
faculty. In our view, this is based on the mistaken assumption that, apart from the process 
of fixing referents of indexicals, the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance is to 
be entirely accounted for by processes internal to the grammar/parser. We argue that extra-
linguistic (pragmatic) processes play an essential role in delivering explicature (intuitive 
truth-conditional content) and that there is, therefore, no need to posit optional covert 
indexicals at all, even in a model of linguistic competence. 
 The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we set out the debate 
between pragmaticists (advocates of processes of free enrichment contributing to the 
explicature of the utterance) and semanticists (advocates of covert indexicals in logical 
form that indicate where a pragmatic process may supply a contextual value to 
explicature). Here we also point out three important background assumptions about 
explicature that are shared by the two opposing camps. Then, in section 3, we explain the 
key problem for advocates of covert indexicals, namely, the unstable behaviour of these 
elements as compared with overt indexicals, which has led to the idea that they should be 
treated as optional elements of logical form. The consequences of this move are explored 
in section 4, where we argue that, contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, the 
question whether the optional elements at issue are best treated as syntactic (components of 
logical form) or as wholly pragmatic is still a live issue and that there are compelling 
reasons for preferring the latter approach (that is, free pragmatic enrichment). In section 5, 
we address the wider issue dividing the pragmaticist and the indexicalist, that of how the 
truth-conditional content (the explicature) of an utterance is to be accounted for (via 
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linguistic and/or extralinguistic processes) and the bearing this has on the existence of 
covert indexicals. We end with a short concluding section.  
 
2.   Pragmaticist versus semanticist approaches 
 
Accounts of linguistic communication draw a distinction between two kinds of 
communicated (or speaker-meant) propositions (or thoughts). Consider the following 
exchange:  
 
1.      Max:   How did the party go?  
         Amy:   There wasn’t enough drink and everyone left early. 
 
A likely interpretation by Max of Amy’s utterance, given the question he has just asked 
her, is the following:  
 
2. a.   There wasn’t enough alcoholic drink to satisfy the people at [the party]i and as 
       a result everyone who came to [the party]i left [it]i early. 
 b.   The partyi did not go well. 
 
It seems pretty clear that (2b) is a conversational implicature, a proposition which the 
speaker communicates indirectly and which the hearer pragmatically infers from the more 
directly communicated meaning together with accessible contextual assumptions about the 
characteristics of a successful party. The proposition in (2a) is communicated explicitly, in 
that it is constructed on the template provided by the encoded linguistic meaning; we use 
the term ‘explicature’ for communicated thoughts of this sort. It is generally agreed that 
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explicature content often goes well beyond the meaning that would result from the 
composition of decoded linguistic meaning and saturation of overt indexical elements. The 
explicitly communicated content is that propositional representation, pragmatically 
developed out of the semantic schema (or propositional template) provided by the 
linguistic meaning, which is the basis of ordinary speaker-hearer judgements of the 
utterance as true or false (that is, it is the intuitive truth-conditional content of the 
utterance). For Amy’s utterance in (1), this intuitive truth-conditional content includes the 
italicized elements in (2a), whose recovery, virtually everyone agrees, requires pragmatic 
processes. However, the source and nature of these pragmatic processes has been the 
subject of much debate: on the one hand, there are those who believe that ‘free’ (that is, 
pragmatically rather than linguistically motivated) pragmatic processes can contribute 
constituents of explicature, and, on the other hand, there are those who hold that ‘all truth-
conditional effects of extra-linguistic context can be traced to logical form’ (Stanley 2000: 
391). The first camp includes relevance theorists, such as Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), 
Carston (1988, 2002) and Hall (2008), and contextualist philosophers of language, such as 
Bezuidenhout (2002), Neale (2007), Recanati (1993, 2004, 2010a), Soames (2008), and 
Stainton (2006), whom we’ll call collectively ‘pragmaticists’ in this paper. The second 
group, called here ‘semanticists’, includes Stanley (2000, 2002), Elbourne (2008), Martí 
(2006), Stanley and Szabó (2000), Szabó (2001, 2011), King and Stanley (2005), Ludlow 
(2005), Sennet (2011) and Weiskopf (2007).  
 The semanticist and the pragmaticist start from several shared assumptions. First, 
they both agree that the explicature/truth-conditional content goes well beyond the overt 
(phonologically realized) material and includes elements of content such as the italicized 
elements in (2a) above. Although there is occasional disagreement about particular 
examples, due to divergent intuitions about exactly what elements the truth or falsity of the 
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utterance depends on, they agree that what is explicitly communicated should be taken to 
be the ‘intuitive’ truth-conditional content – that is, the basis on which ordinary speaker-
hearers would take the utterance to be true or false, would agree or disagree with it, etc. 
Semanticists frequently emphasize that the basic data of semantic theorizing is native-
speaker intuitions about truth-conditional content (see, for example, King and Stanley 
2005: 141; Stanley and Szabó 2000: 240). So this shared conception of truth-conditional 
content is non-minimalist, and in this respect, both semanticist and pragmaticist line up 
against those such as Cappelen and Lepore (2005), who claim that there is a minimal 
proposition that results from just linguistic decoding, disambiguation, and saturation of the 
small number of overtly context-sensitive elements, or the even more minimalist Borg 
(2004).
1
 Both sides in the present debate agree that the context-sensitivity of truth-
conditional content is far more widespread than this; their disagreement, as will become 
clearer below, lies in what they believe is responsible for it. They take the fact that our 
assessments of an utterance’s truth are based on this non-minimal conception of truth-
conditional content to be evidence for its psychological reality; in contrast, there is no 
reason to think that the minimal proposition (in Cappelen and Lepore’s sense) is a level of 
representation in the comprehension process at all.  
 A second point of agreement is that, in describing the processes that are responsible 
for the recovery of explicature, the ultimate aim is to account for the (typically) smooth 
and rapid process of linguistic communication, even when the utterance employs a 
sentence that speaker and/or hearer may never have encountered before (see, for instance, 
                                                 
1
  From a minimalist perspective, Stanley and the other semanticists could be considered ‘contextualists’ 
because they allow that there are contextual contributions to the proposition expressed that go beyond the 
resolution of obvious context-sensitivity (overt pronouns, demonstratives, etc.) Other authors, e.g. Recanati 
(2004), however, contrast Stanley’s position (‘indexicalism’) with contextualism, represented by Recanati, 
Bezuidenhout, Neale, Soames, and Stainton, while some who share many of the latter group’s commitments 
reject the label ‘contextualism’ (e.g. Carston 2009). We avoid the term here, using ‘semanticist’ and 
‘pragmaticist’ to reflect the fact that the two camps offer, respectively, highly semantically-oriented versus 
highly pragmatically-oriented accounts of the data. 
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Stanley 2007: 10). Finally, both approaches are ‘original-utterance centric’ - that is, their 
focus is squarely on the proposition that is explicitly expressed/communicated in the 
specific original situation of utterance and so is entirely determined by facts about the 
original speaker, her audience and their common context. In this regard, again, both differ 
from Cappelen and Lepore (2005), who reject original-utterance centrism in favour of 
‘speech-act pluralism’ – that is, the view that an utterance can have a wide range of 
propositional contents, some of which are determined by contexts other than that of the 
original utterance, including, in particular, contexts in which the utterance is being reported 
by a third party and so may include facts unavailable to the original speaker or her 
audience (ibid: 201).   
 Among the examples that have been discussed by both parties are the following, 
each of which can be used to communicate an explicature with one or more components of 
content  that are not obviously the values of an element supplied by the linguistic form:  
 
3. It’s raining.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 Explicature: IT IS RAINING IN LONDON
2
 
 
4. Ann:  Would you like to stay and have dinner with us.  
 Bob:  No thanks, I’ve already eaten.  
 Explicature of Bob’s reply: BOB HAS ALREADY EATEN DINNER THAT EVENING 
 
5. The candidate arrived late.   
 Explicature: THE CANDIDATE FOR THE PRAGMATICS JOB ARRIVED LATE FOR THE  
                                                 
2
  From this point on, we represent explicatures in small caps, thereby distinguishing them (and other 
conceptual representations) from linguistic expressions. The characterizations of the explicatures above are 
intended to illustrate where unarticulated constituents arise, and thus sometimes ignore details such as the 
fact that natural-language pronouns (e.g. ‘he’ in (6)) will have been assigned referents.   
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                                       INTERVIEW 
 
6. He insulted her and she hit him.  
 Explicature: HE INSULTED HER AND THEN AS A RESULT SHE HIT HIM 
 
7. Mother to child crying over a small cut on his knee: You’re not going to die.  
 Explicature: YOU ARE NOT GOING TO DIE FROM THAT LITTLE CUT 
 
8. His glass is empty.  
 Explicature: HIS GLASS IS APPROXIMATELY EMPTY OF BEER 
 
All of these examples are very familiar and have been extensively discussed in the 
literature of both camps, so we will assume there is no need to discuss them further here; 
the explicature in each case answers to naive intuitions about what the speaker expressed 
and is the basis on which further communicated assumptions (implicatures) are inferred. 
 The two sides in the debate have different approaches to accounting for the 
‘extra’ elements of explicature in these examples. The pragmaticist claims that these 
elements are ‘unarticulated constituents’ (UCs), where ‘unarticulated’ means not just 
unpronounced but not present at any level of linguistic representation (not a feature of the 
language faculty). Their provision is wholly pragmatically motivated – by the requirement 
to meet a standard of sufficient contextual relevance – and they are composed into the 
content by a process which has been labelled ‘free enrichment’3, where what is meant by 
                                                 
3
 This is, of course, not ‘semantic composition’ as traditionally understood, but a composition process that 
acts on a mixture of semantic (decoded) and pragmatically inferred material. For a detailed attempt to work 
out a formal account of pragmatic composition, see Recanati (2010a). 
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‘free’ is that the pragmatic process is not linguistically triggered or mandated4. It is an 
optional process, as far as the linguistic meaning is concerned, hence it need not take place 
in all contexts but only when it is required for pragmatic reasons. The semanticist rejects 
this approach, for a reason which we discuss below, holding that there are no ‘free’ 
pragmatic effects on explicature. On this view, explicatures are fully linguistically 
articulated, and the only pragmatic processes affecting them are linguistically mandated, 
hence obligatorily take place in all contexts of utterance. 
 Given that semanticists agree with pragmaticists on what it is that they are aiming 
to explain – the non-minimal, intuitive, conception of truth-conditional content – how do 
they account for the elements of explicature that do not appear to be the values of anything 
in the overt linguistic form? Their explanation is that there are covert indexicals attached to 
certain lexical items, which are, therefore, present in logical form whenever the item is 
tokened. For instance, weather verbs might encode a location variable, and, on Stanley and 
Szabó’s (2000) proposal, every nominal encodes a domain variable, which accounts for 
quantifier domain restriction, the completion of definite descriptions, and so on.
5
 The kinds 
of structures envisaged are shown (in rough form) here: 
 
9. It is <raining at Loc L> 
                                                 
4
  As far as we are aware, the first use of the term ‘free enrichment’ was by Recanati (1993: 243, 258-9), 
where it included cases of unarticulated constituents: e.g. the ’extra’, pragmatically inferred constituents in 
(1) and (3)-(8). Since that time, work in truth-conditional pragmatics has led to new distinctions and 
clarifications of the range of pragmatic processes, so that the term is sometimes used in a more restrictive 
way, which excludes cases of UCs (see Recanati 2010a: 22-24). We continue to use the term ‘free 
enrichment’ for cases of UCs, because they both involve a pragmatic process of developing (enriching) the 
linguistically decoded content into a further mental representation and are ‘free’ inasmuch as they are not 
linguistically mandated. See Recanati (2012: section 5) for discussion of this use of the term ‘free 
enrichment’.  
 
5
  In fact, Stanley and Szabó’s (2000) proposal is that every nominal encodes a pair of domain restriction 
indices: a function index and an argument index, as indicated in (11) and (12). Since it does not matter for the 
issues discussed in this paper, we follow the usual practice of speaking as if the proposal is that there is a 
single domain variable. 
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10. I’ve <eaten, object> <time> 
11. The <candidate, f(i)> was late. 
12. The <Russian, f(i)> voted for the <Russian, f(i)>
 6
 
  
If this approach can be extended to account for all genuine effects of context on 
explicature, then, apart from disambiguation, the only pragmatic process involved in 
getting from logical form to explicature would be saturation of (overt and covert) 
indexicals: there would be no ‘intrusion’ by pragmatic processes that have no linguistic 
mandate. As Stanley says, ‘If my proposal is correct, there is no gap between the 
linguistically determined content of a sentence, relative to a context, and the proposition it 
intuitively seems to express’ (2007: 5). The elimination of a gap between linguistically 
determined content (relative to context) and proposition expressed (explicature) is seen as 
desirable by many authors because of a concern they have with the ‘free’ enrichment that 
would be required to bridge any gap. The problem is that, since it is not linguistically 
mandated, it is unclear how (or that) the process of enrichment can be properly 
constrained, which gives rise to the worry that no systematic account of our grasp of 
explicature is possible if we admit the existence of this mysterious new process. In 
contrast, the semanticist approach claims to make use of only the familiar, independently 
required mechanism of indexical saturation and is, therefore, seen as making an explicit 
account of how hearers get from linguistic meaning to explicature much more 
methodologically tractable.  
 As presented by the semanticists, this objection creates the appearance of a wide 
gulf between the two approaches in terms of their prospects of giving a systematic theory 
of our grasp of explicature/truth conditions. However, they never elaborate on what it is to 
                                                 
6
  To get the idea here, imagine an ice-skating competition where the individuals comprising the judging 
panel have a range of nationalities (including one Russian) and similarly for the competitors.  
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be ‘systematic’, so the objection is too vague to assess properly and we do not attempt a 
detailed response here. But, since the semanticists frequently appeal to this systematicity 
claim,
7
 we will respond briefly by pointing out that the implication that there is a vast 
difference between the two accounts in this respect is a gross exaggeration. As has been 
emphasized by Sperber and Wilson (e.g. 1986/1995: 12), the process of working out the 
values of many indexicals is just as mysterious as the process of free pragmatic 
enrichment: for any utterance of “he” or “that”, there will be multiple referents that meet 
the linguistically-provided constraints.
8
 This example from Blakemore (1987) illustrates 
how contextual prominence of a potential referent that meets the linguistically-encoded 
constraints is not sufficient for correct reference assignment to the occurrences of ‘it’ in 
B’s reply: 
   
13. A:  Have you heard Perahia’s recording of the Moonlight Sonata? 
        B:  Yes, it made me realize that I would never be able to play it. 
 
The mere fact that some linguistic meaning is present in the form of an overt indexical, 
then, does not bring us any closer to an account of how the gap between the logical form 
and explicature is bridged, and the same would apply, a fortiori, to the hidden indexicals 
posited by the semanticist. The gain in systematicity that comes from moving to a hidden 
indexical account is far less than is implied by the semanticists’ criticisms of free 
enrichment: the one thing that covert indexicals do, at least in principle, and which free 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Marti (2006: 151), who says that the defenders of free enrichment have yet to provide ‘a 
coherent, specific and detailed algorithm that explicates the operation of the process of free enrichment’, as 
well as Stanley (2007: 10), and many other places. 
  
8
 In recent years, certain philosophers have also acknowledged this; see especially Neale (2007: 80-1). Clapp 
(2012a: 458-9) independently makes a similar point. He maintains that, if the proposed ‘unobvious 
indexicals’ exist at all, Gricean principles (thus non-demonstrative inference) must play a dominant role in 
determining their content since their linguistic character is ‘extremely lax and [does] not impose significant 
constraints on the values that can be assigned to them’. 
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enrichment does not do, is tell us where pragmatic/contextual contributions to explicature 
will occur (and, as a result, where they cannot occur). However, as we will see in the next 
section, even this apparent advantage of the semanticist position is called into question by 
a significant modification that the covert indexicals approach needs to undergo in order to 
accommodate the fact that these (alleged) indexicals behave rather differently from the 
overt indexicals of which they are supposed to be simply covert counterparts. 
 
3. The move to optional covert variables  
3.1 Covert and overt variables: an asymmetry 
On the semanticist approach, covert indexical elements (which we’ll also refer to as 
‘aphonics’, following Neale 2007) are assumed to be present in the logical form of a 
sentence wherever intuition has it that some pragmatic process can contribute to 
explicature. The problem is that in many cases, they are idle or redundant. This can be seen 
clearly if we compare these covert elements with their (alleged) overt counterparts. Overt 
indexicals are obligatorily assigned a contextual value (unless they are bound to a 
quantifier). This is the case also for uncontroversial cases of covert indexicals, such as the 
third-person pronoun in pro-drop languages, for instance Spanish, which is generally not 
made overt unless it is needed for clarification or emphasis: 
 
14. a.  She put it there.  
 b.  # LISA PUT SOMETHING SOMEWHERE 
 
15. a.  [Spanish] Baila.  (dance -3
rd
-sing-pres.tense)  
 b.  # SOMEONE DANCES  
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An utterance of (14a) will not have been fully understood (as indicated by the #) if the 
hearer does not recover specific values for all of the (overt) indexicals. Similarly, an 
utterance of (15a) has not been understood if all that the hearer recovers is that ‘someone 
dances’, or ‘there is dancing’. In contrast, it appears that, in many of their occurrences, the 
covert indexicals that the semanticist posits are not saturated, without there being any sense 
that the utterance has not been completely understood. Consider (16): 
 
16. It is <raining at Loc L> 
  
According to the semanticists, a variable is present in the logical form mandating 
saturation. Yet a location-indefinite interpretation is possible in certain contexts.  
 
Here are some examples for which such an interpretation would arise:  
 
17. Why does it rain? It rains because water vapour in the air condenses and ... 
      (see also discussion in Cappelen and Lepore 2007) 
18. a.   Once, in Antiquity, it rained blood. Since then, it has never happened again.  
 b.   Once, in the middle ages, it rained for a hundred years.   
         (Recanati 2007) 
 c.   On the day of judgment, it will rain dead people.  
       (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2007) 
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In these cases, the explicature (truth-conditional content) of the ‘rain’ clauses appears to be 
just: IT IS RAINING/RAINED SOMEWHERE (or IT IS RAINING [punkt]).
9
 Although the raining 
event takes place at a location, so that location can be considered what Recanati (2002) 
calls a ‘metaphysical unarticulated constituent’ of the utterance, it does not seem to be part 
of what is communicated (nor is it likely to be represented by the speaker or hearer at all). 
It has been suggested (by Martí 2006 among others) that such examples do in fact involve 
an inferred location, namely ‘the earth’. If correct, this would mean that the location 
variable with weather verbs is always saturated with a specific value, just as overt 
indexicals are. It is not clear to us that this is plausible for all the examples in (17) and 
(18), or that the suggestion that a location is inferred is supported by anything other than 
the need to maintain as close a parallel as possible between overt and covert indexicals
10
. 
Moreover, Recanati’s view is supported by the behaviour of other verbs. It is undeniable 
that utterances of sentences with the verb ‘rain’ (or other meteorological verbs) very often 
communicate a specific location and this gives an initial reason for thinking that these 
verbs might come with a linguistically provided location variable. In contrast, it is 
generally agreed that verbs like ‘dance’ and ‘sing’ do not come with such a variable, 
because utterances containing them are often fully understood without the recovery of any 
location of the dancing/singing: 
 
19. a. Mary sings/is singing to keep her spirits up. 
 b. Last night, we danced until dawn.  
 
                                                 
9
  The pragmatic explanation here is that while it is most often relevant to us to know the location of an event 
of raining, this is not inevitably the case. In the examples in (17) and (18), relevance turns on something other 
than location (the nature of the rain, the object that is rained or the length of the raining event).    
10
  Recanati (2007) gives detailed arguments, which we endorse, against the idea that examples such as (17)-
(18) involve the inferred location ‘the earth’.  
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However, in certain instances, such as (20a), a location is recovered as a constituent of the 
explicature, so these are clear cases for which the location constituent is optional: 
 
20. a.   We went to the Royal Festival Hall last night – Pavarotti was singing. 
 b.   PAVAROTTI WAS SINGING AT THE ROYAL FESTIVAL HALL AT TIME t 
 c.   Pavarotti was <singing at Loc l>  
  
The explicature of the second clause of (20a) is given in (20b). To maintain the thesis that 
all truth-conditional effects of context are traceable to logical form, the semanticist would 
have to say that the logical form of (20a) is that given in (20c). It looks, then, as if, on the 
semanticist account, virtually every verb in the language would have to have an encoded 
location variable, even those which are almost never interpreted with a specific location. 
We are not aware of anyone having suggested that, in cases such as (19a), the explicitly 
communicated content includes an inferred location constituent, such as ‘on earth’, and we 
take it that the semanticists would not endorse this idea.
11
 Here, then, we have a case where 
it looks very much as if the semanticist must say that a covert indexical is present, but that 
saturation is optional.  
 
Consider now the case of ‘eat’. In example (4) above, ‘I have eaten’, or the case of the 
mother who says ‘Eat!’ while placing a plate of food in front of her child, the object is left 
unexpressed (unpronounced) and the hearer infers it. But an interpretation which is 
indefinite with regard to what is eaten (or when the eating took place) is possible:  
 
21. John is anorexic but he’s eaten today. 
                                                 
11
 An alternative analysis that the semanticist might appeal to in this case would be to posit event variables. 
We explain at the end of the next section why this does not succeed. 
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22. Lucy has eaten in the best Parisian restaurants. 
  
These have the interpretation that John/Lucy has eaten something (or ‘has eaten punkt’). 
So, again, the alleged covert indexical for object eaten is not saturated with a context-
specific value. 
 A different but related issue arises concerning domain variables. Consider the 
examples in (23a) and (24a), due to Breheny (2003). On the view of Stanley and 
Szabó (2000), according to which every nominal comes with a domain variable as a matter 
of its lexical structure, (23a) has the structure in (23b) and (24a) has the structure in (24b). 
This seems fine for (23a), where the adjective ‘former’ takes both the nominal and the 
domain in its scope, giving the interpretation in (23c):  
 
23. a.   Our boss sends every former secretary a Christmas card.  
 b.   Our boss sends every former <secretary, f(i)> a Christmas card.  
 c.   Our boss sends every [former [secretary of our company]] a Christmas card. 
  
But it does not work for (24a), where the intuitive truth-conditional content is as in (24c), 
with the domain ‘at the party’ falling outside the scope of the adjective ‘former’:  
 
24. a.   Every former policeman was asked to leave.  
 b.   Every former <policeman, f(i)> was asked to leave.  
 c.   Every [[former policeman] at the party] was asked to leave. 
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So the representation in (24b) seems to be wrong: the domain variable cannot cohabit a 
node with the noun. It looks, then, as if domain variables can be adjoined in several 
different positions in logical form.  
 What these examples indicate is that the covert elements posited by the semanticist 
are not simply covert counterparts of overt indexicals; rather, they seem to be a new and 
unknown category of linguistic element (as noted by Carston 2000; Recanati 2002; Martí 
2006; Hall 2009). Saturation of indexicals is obligatory, at least when one considers those 
indexicals whose existence is uncontroversial – that is, the overt ones, and the silent 
pronouns in pro-drop languages. So the semanticist faces the problem of reconciling the 
following two commitments: (a) All truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to 
logical form, so there have to be some covert variables to account for when and where such 
effects occur; (b) Whenever an indexical (overt or covert) is present, it must be saturated.
12
 
 
3.2 The semanticist solution: optional covert variables 
Within the semanticist camp, Martí (2006) has acknowledged this problem and proposed a 
solution to it by relocating the source of optionality. She suggests that what is optional is 
the generation of variables (covert indexicals) in the syntax. She presents this idea as a 
modification of the more standard covert indexical account of Stanley (2000) and Stanley 
and Szabó (2000): ‘We need to give them [Stanley’s variables] the freedom to be or not to 
                                                 
12
 A reader has suggested that we need to consider an alternative account, which is that the variables are 
existentially closed by default when they are not assigned specific values. Recanati (2002: 326-8) notes that, 
for this idea to have any initial plausibility, we would need to find examples of overt variables undergoing 
existential closure by default. But overt variables are not subject to existential closure (see our discussion of 
example (14) above).  Martí (2006: 152-53) endorses Recanati’s criticism, and develops an alternative 
semanticist solution to the optionality problem, which we introduce next: optional variables. While we 
recognise that there has been much debate, still unresolved, about the existence of existential closure, our 
purpose in this paper is to assess the idea of optional variables.  Therefore, as Martí does, we take as our 
starting-point the assumption that existential closure is ruled out as a general solution for the kinds of case 
under discussion here: ‘sing’ (see example 19) is highly unlikely to encode a location variable, which is 
existentially closed on the vast majority of tokenings.      
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be generated in the syntax/present at logical form, ... a kind of optionality that has nothing 
to do with the pragmatics-related optionality of free enrichment’ (Martí 2006: 135). So, on 
this approach, the surface form ‘It is raining’ would have two logical forms: one with a 
covert location variable and another without any such variable.
13
 When the sentence 
uttered has the first kind of logical form, the variable (indexical) is always saturated with a 
specific value for the location, just as for overt indexicals. As noted above, there has been 
some debate over whether ‘rain’ and other weather verbs really have location-indefinite 
interpretations (Martí herself is sceptical). The semanticist does face the problem of the 
optionality of saturation, though, as we demonstrated with the verb ‘sing’ in examples 
(19)-(20). Martí’s optional variable idea is a potential solution to the problem posed by 
these and possibly several other kinds of example
14
, and therefore merits consideration, 
regardless of exactly which expressions turn out to need to be analysed this way. 
 
Stanley (2007) makes a somewhat similar move to Martí’s in a revision of his view on 
domain variables – a revision motivated in part by Breheny’s (2003) examples given in 
(23) and (24) above. Here he maintains that domain variables are adjoinable in different 
positions (Stanley 2007: 223, note 15). So the surface form ‘every former secretary’ has (at 
least) two logical forms, one in which the adjective takes the domain variable along with 
the noun in its scope, and one in which it doesn’t:  
 
                                                 
13
  In fact, there is a third logical form, containing two variables, which is necessary for bound readings, as in 
the most natural reading of ‘Whenever John lights a cigarette, it rains’ (see Martí 2006: 143). It is not clear 
whether the idea is that this is automatically generated whenever the verb ‘rain’ is tokened (in which case the 
added complexity would reinforce our arguments below) or it is triggered only when the phrase comes 
embedded in a potential binding context. We omit further consideration of this third option.  
 
14
 Here are some examples of where a pragmatic contribution to explicature is optional: causal readings of 
‘and’-conjunctions, illustrated in (6); metaphor and metonymy (see Stern 2006); scalar inferences (see 
Breheny et al 2006); Travis cases such as those involving colour predicates (see Clapp 2012b), and so on. 
Martí also suggests that intransitive ‘eat’ has an optional object variable (see examples (21) and (22) above).  
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25. a.   ... every former <secretary, f(i)> ...  
 b.   ... every <former secretary, f(i)> ... 
  
 The move to ‘covert optionals’, as Recanati (2010b) calls them, seems to dissolve 
the problem of the apparent difference between overt and covert indexicals, while still 
allowing the semanticist to steer clear of the process of free pragmatic enrichment. 
However, the important question, which we consider in the next section, is whether this 
provides a workable alternative account of the processing of these utterances. More 
generally, does it advance us towards the goal of providing a systematic theory of our 
grasp of explicature and of accounting for the smoothness and rapidity of linguistic 
communication? First, note one consequence of the move: a sentence whose logical form 
could include up to three such aphonics would have eight distinct logical forms; a sentence 
whose logical form could include up to four aphonics would have 16 logical forms; and so 
on (see Carston 2000: 34-35). This massive proliferation of logical forms corresponding to 
a single surface form seems to be both wildly counterintuitive and to impose an extreme 
computational burden, so it is hard to see that it could be reconciled with the typical 
smoothness and rapidity of our communication. Martí herself acknowledges that her 
approach seems to entail that ‘the speaker and hearer are burdened with an intolerable 
computational load’ (2006: 150), but points out that this is a general problem for standard 
treatments of indexicals (as in, for example, Heim and Kratzer 1998), so should not be held 
against her account. In any case, she maintains, the superiority of her proposal to any 
account involving the mysterious, unsystematic, non-standard process of free enrichment 
outweighs any considerations of cost. Although we think issues of computational costs 
(cognitive effort) are of considerable significance, we set them aside in what follows 
because it is very unclear how to make a meaningful cost/effort comparison between the 
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kind of utterance comprehension account that we are developing (inherently a matter of a 
performance mechanism) and the linguistic competence-oriented approach of Martí (see 
discussion in section 5 below). 
 Second, as discussed in section 3.1, the only sense in which saturation of a covert 
variable is more constrained than free enrichment is that the presence of variables in the 
linguistic form determines where a pragmatic contribution will occur and where it will not. 
Make the variables optional, though, and the systematicity advantage of the semanticist 
account diminishes still further: the most that can now be said is that the standing linguistic 
meaning determines where a pragmatic contribution might occur (and where it definitely 
will not). So, one consequence of making the optionality move is that the semanticist 
account becomes less predictive. The real problem, however, arises from the fact that we 
now have a further process required for the recovery of explicature: since the imperceptible 
variables are optional, there is a preliminary somewhat mysterious (presumably pragmatic) 
process of figuring out for an utterance of ‘It’s raining’, ‘I’ve eaten’, etc., whether or not 
the logical form contains a variable. As we discuss in the next section, this additional 
process makes the account unworkable as an explanation of how the truth-conditional 
content is recovered in on-line comprehension.  
 
4. Optional syntax versus optional pragmatics: six of one and half a dozen of the 
 other?  
 
In a recent paper discussing this move on the part of the semanticists (or ‘indexicalists’, as 
he calls them), François Recanati (2010b: 38) claims that an account in terms of ‘covert 
optionals’ is simply ‘another – admittedly deflationary – syntactic construal of free 
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pragmatic processes.’15 The only difference, he says, ‘is that the level of syntactic 
representation to which the additional elements belong remains within the confines of the 
language system (rather than involving a shift to the conceptual system)’ (ibid: 38). And, 
he adds, whether or not this is a substantive difference and what its consequences are 
remain to be determined. The semanticists would maintain that the difference is highly 
consequential: they abhor the idea of free enrichment and aim at a rigorous (linguistically 
controlled) alternative. As pragmaticists, we also think the difference between the two 
accounts is significant but maintain that it is the free pragmatic enrichment approach that 
emerges as the better account once facts about the processing of utterances in on-line 
interpretation are brought into the picture. 
 Recall that the shared aim is to explain the hearer’s grasp of explicature, as part of 
the broader project of accounting for the ‘smoothness and rapidity of linguistic 
communication’. The suggestion from the semanticist/indexicalist is that covert indexicals 
are required to explain this process. However, no argument is given for the necessity of 
indexicals or the incompatibility of free enrichment with the facts to be accounted for. Our 
question, then, is: what role do the (alleged) optional aphonics play in 
communication/comprehension that is not achieved by optional (free) pragmatic 
enrichment? First, consider the pragmatic processes that are involved in an account of on-
line comprehension that features syntactically optional covert elements. There must be two 
obligatory (linguistically mandated) pragmatic processes: (a) Selection of the correct 
logical form (a kind of structural disambiguation), and (b) In the case where the chosen 
                                                 
15
  There are broadly two construals of free enrichment, a semantic one and a syntactic one (see Recanati 
2002: 339-42). On the semantic construal, the output of free pragmatic processes is a proposition, a truth 
condition or a state of affairs, that is, a semantic object, rather than a representation. On the syntactic 
construal, the output is a mental representation, a structured string of symbols. For relevance theorists and 
most pragmaticists, it is a conceptual representation, a sentence of Mentalese, the representational medium in 
which we think and store our beliefs, as distinct from those syntactic representations which are specific to our 
linguistic systems (our I-languages, in Chomsky’s terms). Recanati’s (2010b) use of ‘syntactic’ is in the 
broad sense of ‘mental representational’ which encompasses both conceptual and linguistic representations.  
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logical form includes a covert indexical, provision of a context-specific value 
(saturation). Now let’s see how these would play out in the interpretation of a concrete 
example:  
 
26. Ann and Ben are in their London flat and Ann has just got off the phone after 
 talking to her parents who live in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
 Ben:  How’s your mother? 
 Ann:  She’s a bit fed up. It’s raining so she can’t get out into the garden.  
 
Focussing here on the underlined conjunct in Ann’s reply, we assume that everyone would 
agree that the explicature (truth-conditional content) is, roughly, IT IS RAINING IN 
CHRISTCHURCH NEW ZEALAND AT TIME T. On the covert optionals account, the value for 
the location must result from the saturation of a variable, so the logical form that contains 
the variable must have been selected. The question here concerns the process by which this 
selection comes about, that is, what the grounds are for the hearer’s choice of the logical 
form containing the location variable.  
 The answer in brief (explained in more detail below) is that the basis for the 
selection of this logical form is the contextual salience of the location constituent 
CHRISTCHURCH NEW ZEALAND. This constituent is highly accessible to the hearer since he 
knows that Ann is reporting on the situation where her mother lives. So assuming that it is 
plausible and sufficiently relevant to him that the proposition expressed by the speaker is 
IT IS RAINING IN CHRISTCHURCH NEW ZEALAND, this would provide the basis for selection 
of the variable-containing logical form. But what this indicates is that the context-specific 
content of the (alleged) location variable is recovered before the variable itself. So it looks 
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very much as if the covert optionals approach is getting the order of processing back-to-
front. 
 On Martí’s (2006) account, for any given instance of an utterance of ‘It is raining’, 
the various possible interpretations based on the distinct logical forms (LFs) are tried out or 
tested to see which of them complies best with both linguistic and contextual/pragmatic 
constraints (ibid: 141-146). This could play out in various ways: it may be that the order of 
testing is serial and random, or that it is serial but with the most economical one tried first, 
or that all possible derivations
16
 are tried out in parallel. Focusing again on the example in 
(26), let’s start with the serial testing approach, which is widely assumed to be the correct 
parsing model where syntactic ambiguity is concerned (Frazier 1987). If this is random, 
then on some occasions of utterance, the LF containing a location variable might be the 
first one tested; it will be saturated with the highly accessible constituent IN CHRISTCHURCH 
NEW ZEALAND  and will satisfy pragmatic principles (e.g. the hearer’s expectation of 
relevance),
17
 so that works fine. But consider what happens on the scenario where the first 
version tested is the LF without a variable, that is, the LF which, according to this account, 
would preclude the occurrence of any context-specific location constituent in the 
explicature and so determine the interpretation IT IS RAINING punkt (or, perhaps, IT IS 
RAINING SOMEWHERE). That interpretation would patently not meet the hearer’s expectation 
of rational communicative behaviour in the situation described in (26) since being told of 
the existence of some unlocated raining event is completely irrelevant, so this LF would be 
                                                 
16
  Recall that Martí (2006) considers several more derivational possibilities for ‘It is raining’ than the two we 
focus on here, including those with a quantifier that may or may not bind the raining location, e.g. ‘Whenever 
I light a cigarette it rains’. 
 
17
  Martí herself prefers to employ Gricean maxims rather than relevance-theoretic pragmatics but obviously 
this makes no difference to the point we are making here.  When considering which of the various possible 
derivations wins on a particular occasion of use of ‘It is raining’, she says: ‘Why is it that (1) [It’s raining] 
does not mean just ‘it’s raining somewhere’? … Here I appeal to Gricean principles. A priori, this is a 
possible derivation but it has to compete with a derivation in which Luisa’s utterance is much more relevant 
to the situation at hand. I.e., Klaus [the hearer] could take her to mean it’s raining somewhere, but that would 
not be relevant to anything they have said or done.’ (Martí 2006: 145). 
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rejected and the variable-containing version tried. Clearly, exactly the same thing would 
occur on a non-random serial account, which is the more plausible version of the serial 
model. On this account, the possibilities are tested in order of their complexity, starting 
with the simplest – here, the LF without the variable.18  
 Now, crucially, what we need to be clear about is what it is that prevents an 
interpretation based on the variable-free LF representation from being successful. Given 
that this is a serial processing account, it is not because there is another version of the 
logical form available so the hearer should try that and see if he can find a value to saturate 
it. Rather, the relevance-seeking hearer cannot help but recognize that the 
communicatively intended propositional content is IT IS RAINING IN CHRISTCHURCH NEW 
ZEALAND, and it is this that serves as the grounds for the rejection of the minimal LF 
(which would block the derivation of a location constituent) and the consequent accessing 
and testing of the LF that contains a location variable. But if the hearer has already 
accessed the representation that includes the context-specific location of the raining event, 
there is no need for him to make the further move of selecting the variable-containing LF 
and saturating the variable with the relevant content. So, within the serial testing versions 
of the comprehension process involving optional covert indexicals, the context-specific 
location constituent can be (on the random order of testing) - and must be (on the ‘simplest 
LF first’ version) - derived before the LF with the location variable is selected, in which 
case the variable is playing no role in processing and is redundant. 
 Consider now an account on which both (all) possible derivations with their distinct 
LFs are tried out in parallel (which, however, is rather unlikely, given the processing costs 
involved).  On the face of it, this way of construing the selection process might not seem to 
                                                 
18
  This scenario respects the highly plausible assumption that, ceteris paribus, the simplest analysis will be 
tried first. Economy in sentence processing is generally supported by work on parsing heuristics (see Frazier 
1987, Altmann 1998) and by more general Zipfian considerations (see Horn 2004). 
25 
 
 
run into the redundancy problem that arises for the serial testing approaches. Focusing 
again on the utterance of ‘It’s raining’ in (26), suppose we have the two LFs, [It is raining] 
and [It is <raining at Loc L>] proffered in parallel to the pragmatic processor, which has at 
its disposal the salient contextual information about the phone-call to Ann’s mother. The 
interpretation that satisfies relevance requirements is clearly that it is raining in 
Christchurch, New Zealand (at such and such a time) and so it might seem obvious that it 
is the second (variable containing) LF that is successful here. But, again, the question is: 
what role is being played by the variable and why does the simple (variable-free) LF fail? 
The semanticist’s answer is that the variable indicates the position in the propositional 
structure where a pragmatic process is to take place and the LF without a variable indicates 
that no pragmatic process (that could affect truth conditions) is to take place.  
 Note that the claim that the variable-free LF precludes the pragmatic provision of 
any content is a matter of pure stipulation (free enrichment is ruled out by fiat). For the 
sake of our argument, however, let’s accept it for a moment and think about how the 
interpretation of ‘It’s raining’ in (26) would work if there was only the one (variable-free) 
LF. Given the high relevance of the place at which the raining is occurring, it must be that 
it would arise as an implicature, so the interpretation would be as follows (omitting 
inessential details): 
 
27. Proposition expressed:  IT’S RAINING (SOMEWHERE) SO X CAN’T GET OUT INTO X’S  
       GARDEN 
 Implicature:  IT’S RAINING IN CHRISTCHURCH, NZ, SO X CAN’T GET OUT INTO X’S  
              GARDEN   
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This is the kind of analysis that would be advocated by some Gricean philosophers who 
favour a minimal ‘what is said’ (for discussion, see Carston 2002, 2004; Recanati 2004). 
The reason the semanticists we are debating with here would not advocate this is that, as 
discussed in section 3, they share with us the view that the target of inquiry is intuitive 
truth-conditional content (explicitly communicated speaker meaning) and, in this instance, 
that content is identical to the proposition (allegedly) implicated in (27). Suppose, now, 
that we lift the arbitrary stipulation that no pragmatic process can take place without a 
variable indicating that it must:
19
 the immediate result is that the variable-free LF is 
pragmatically enriched with the location constituent and what is labelled ‘implicature’ in 
(27) is, in fact, the explicature of the utterance (and there is no irrelevant ‘proposition 
expressed’ or ‘what is said’ as in (27)). Thus, it seems that when the location constituent is 
highly accessible and relevant, as it so clearly is in example (26), it is composed directly 
into the explicature, whichever of the logical forms is taken as its basis. So, even on the 
parallel testing approach, the LF containing a covert location variable is redundant. In 
short, the linguistic starting point for the comprehension of utterances of ‘It’s raining’ is 
just that logical form for which the hearer has perceptible linguistic evidence – that is, the 
simple variable-free version
20
. 
 This argument is reinforced by the case of expressions for which provision of a 
specific value is much rarer, as on the few occasions where a location is inferred with the 
verb ‘sing’, illustrated in (20) (‘We went to the Royal Festival Hall last night. Pavarotti 
                                                 
19
  In fact, we think the stipulation is not only arbitrary but false: for arguments to this effect, see the 
discussion in Hall (2008) and (Clapp 2012a).  
20
 An attempt at providing linguistic evidence for these covert indexicals is Stanley’s (2000) binding 
argument, which assumes that, if a bound interpretation is available, there must be a bindable variable in the 
logical form. However, no evidence is given for this assumption. Compare a well-attested case of covert 
structure, such as wh-traces, where grammaticality judgments provide evidence of their presence in logical 
form; in contrast, the only judgments adduced in support of the covert indexicals under discussion here are 
judgments about interpretations: there is no syntactic evidence for this allegedly covert syntax. See Collins 
(2007) for further development of this point.  
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was singing.’) Let’s imagine that the grammar provides, for an utterance of ‘was singing’, 
the option of a logical form with a covert location variable. The infrequency of use of this 
logical form as compared to the version with no location variable would make the latter far 
more accessible to the pragmatic interpretation mechanisms and thus more likely to be 
tested first on the parallel processing model on which the parser presents all possibilities 
simultaneously to pragmatic interpretation.
21
  Given the decoded linguistic meaning 
PAVAROTTI WAS SINGING in its immediately preceding discourse context, the hearer 
constructs the assumption PAVAROTTI WAS SINGING AT THE ROYAL FESTIVAL HALL and 
accepts this as the explicitly expressed meaning. The covert optionals account requires that 
the hearer, on that basis, rejects the variable-free logical form and recovers a different 
logical form with an imperceptible location variable, solely in order to achieve the desired 
structural match between logical form and explicature. We suggest that an account on 
which the hearer stops at the previous stage is more plausible: he has successfully worked 
out, on the basis of the variable-free logical form, what the explicature is. The putative 
location variable is entirely redundant in this case – it need never play a role in the 
interpretation of the types of predicates that rarely require a location to be inferred. The 
frequency facts are the opposite for the weather predicate cases: the location-specific 
interpretation is much more frequent than the interpretation without a location constituent, 
which would seem to favour the variable-containing LF being tested first. However, the 
case of ‘sing’ shows that the location-specific interpretation is derivable without any 
location variable, from which it follows that the variable is equally redundant in the case of 
weather predicates. This confirms the arbitrariness, mentioned above, of the semanticists’ 
stipulation that no pragmatic process (that contributes to explicature) can take place in the 
absence of a variable mandating such a contribution. 
                                                 
21
 See Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) and empirical evidence in Wilson & Matsui (2000) on factors affecting 
accessibility. 
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 The fundamental problem with the ‘covert optionals’ account, then, is that it looks 
as if the selection of the logical form with a variable in it depends on the prior recovery of 
the utterance’s propositional content (explicature). The role of the logical form of an 
utterance is to provide the linguistic input to the pragmatic processes that are responsible 
for working out the intended meaning. For covert variables to play any useful role, they 
should be recovered first so as to indicate to the hearer what kind of values are to be 
pragmatically supplied (as is obviously the case with overt indexicals). But it seems that 
the identification of the logical form depends on the prior (pragmatic) identification of the 
propositional content. The upshot of this processing argument is that certain components of 
the explicature are recovered by a purely pragmatic process and that optional covert 
variables do not provide an alternative mechanism for their recovery. In short, it seems that 
either we take the semanticist route which makes for massive redundancy (and 
accompanying high computational costs) or we allow for occasion-specific instances of 
free pragmatic enrichment and a simple variable-free logical form for ‘sing’, ‘dance’, 
‘rain’, and many other verbs.  
 Before concluding this section, we want to briefly consider a different indexicalist 
solution, according to which predicates introduce a covert event or situation variable. This 
was suggested by Stanley (2000) as an alternative to the idea that weather verbs encode 
location variables, and is apparently the version he now prefers (Stanley 2007: 257-8). The 
idea is that when a speaker utters ‘It’s raining’ she refers to a particular event, and says of 
it that it is a raining event. The referred-to event is the value of an event variable in the 
syntax of the sentence. Although Stanley doesn’t go into detail, the idea seems to be that 
certain aspects of the event such as its location and time are therefore part of what is 
considered the value of the event variable. So, on this sort of account, the location is not a 
linguistically unarticulated constituent (UC) of the utterance. The proposition expressed 
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contains an event, and the speaker and hearer know where the event is taking place on the 
basis of their extra-linguistic world knowledge. 
 However, we fail to see how this event variable account avoids analysing the 
location as a UC. As many verbs, not just weather verbs, would introduce these event 
variables, they would also be present in both the case of ‘Pavarotti was singing’ in (20) 
above, which does express a location, and ‘Last night, we danced until dawn’ in (19b) 
above, which does not. So event variables do not seem to provide a solution for the 
indexicalist, because this account cannot, as far as we can tell, distinguish between cases 
where a location constituent is irrelevant (though perhaps known), in which case the 
location would be merely a ‘metaphysically unarticulated constituent’,22 and cases where 
the location is relevant and needs to be inferred, as in (26) and (20). Recanati (2007: 130-
131) seems to have this point in mind when he writes ‘The place and time of the described 
event do not automatically count as arguments of the predicate, hence they are not 
automatically part of the argument structure, because they are general characteristics of 
events.’  So even on the event variable account, when the location is inferred, it is not 
linguistically mandated but pragmatically required, and forms an extra constituent of 
content additional to any constituent denoting the raining/singing event: it is, therefore, a 
UC.  
 The other class of expressions that Martí considers as candidates for optional 
variables includes ‘eat’ and similar verbs (e.g. ‘drink’, ‘smoke’). As we showed earlier, 
while intransitive uses of ‘eat’ may receive a reading that is indefinite with respect to what 
is eaten (see examples (21) and (22)), in some cases, a specific object may be 
pragmatically supplied (see example (4)). The argument that we have given in this section 
                                                 
22
 It would thus not be represented by the speaker and hearer, and not be part of the truth-conditional content 
of the utterance. 
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about weather verbs applies straightforwardly to cases like ‘eat’: the logical form 
containing a covert optional will only be recovered if the hearer has already worked out 
that the explicature contains a specific object, in which case the variable is redundant.
23
 
 Let us end this section by reiterating the central point of our response to Recanati’s 
claim that there may be ‘no substantive difference’ between the optional covert indexicals 
account and the pragmatic free enrichment account. We maintain that, from the point of 
view of the on-line cognitive processes of utterance comprehension, there is an important 
difference. There can be no saturation without a variable to saturate, but selection of the 
logical form with the covert variable in it is dependent on a prior (pragmatic) process of 
identifying the explicature, so recovery of the variable-containing logical form, followed 
by saturation, is redundant. The moral is that making covert variables/indexicals optional 
divests them of any role in the process of utterance understanding, which seems to be a 
good reason for abandoning them altogether.  
 In the next section, we will consider two related possible semanticist responses to 
this line of argument. The first involves the idea that covert optionals are far more 
linguistically respectable items to add to grammatical/semantic theories than is free 
pragmatic enrichment; the second takes issue with our focus on utterance comprehension, 
which is a cognitive ‘performance’ matter, and maintains that such considerations are 
irrelevant to the kind of linguistic competence model under discussion.
24
       
 
5. Linguistic competence and truth-conditional content  
 
                                                 
23
 See Bourmayan & Recanati (2013) for detailed arguments against a covert-variable approach to these 
intransitive uses, and for an alternative (situation-theoretic) account. 
24
 This response comes from Luisa Martí (p.c.). Whether Jason Stanley would endorse it is not entirely clear, 
given his avowed concern to account for the ‘smoothness and rapidity’ of communication (Stanley 2007). 
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The idea of making covert indexicals syntactically optional seemed initially to get round 
the problem of the apparent optionality of their pragmatic saturation, thus maintaining a 
parallel with overt indexicals. However, it introduces a new dissimilarity since overt 
indexicals are not optional in any way similar to these covert ones. Furthermore, far from 
relying on familiar processes, the move to covert optionals introduces a rather mysterious 
step of deciding whether the indexical/variable is actually there or not, and this appears to 
be a new, and so far unattested, process. 
 Martí is aware that there is not a perfect parallel between her covert optionals and 
attested species of indexical, and, towards the end of the paper, she makes a different, or at 
least a more specific, parallel, suggesting that her optional variables are the covert 
counterparts of overt adjuncts (which are optional): just as ‘in Paris’ and the indexical 
‘there’ are optional modifiers of ‘It’s raining’, so are covert variables. Thus, she can claim 
that these variables are at least similar to familiar elements of the grammar, whereas to 
admit ‘free enrichment into the semantics’, which is how she characterises the pragmaticist 
account (Martí 2006: 135), would be to introduce a wholly new process that is nothing like 
existing ‘semantic’ phenomena. Covert optionals, then, seem to be the conservative, more 
theoretically parsimonious, hence attractive, solution, and if we allow obligatory and 
optional variables, then we do not need free enrichment in the semantics. 
 We agree that introducing a process like free enrichment into the semantics would 
be an unappealing move. However, Martí’s line of argument here rests on a misconstrual 
of the pragmaticist approach, which stems from a basic assumption that underlies her 
whole approach and which, in our view, is mistaken. Her assumption is that the grammar 
(specifically the semantics component) delivers the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance, where this truth-conditional content is equated with explicature. Martí seems to 
assume that free enrichment is intended by pragmaticists to be a semantic process, hence 
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part of a semantic module that is part of the grammar. Free enrichment, she writes, 
‘entail[s] a non-modular, pragmatics-invasive view of the semantics component of the 
grammar’ (2006: 135). But this reasoning conflates two different notions of semantics. On 
the one hand, ‘semantics’ or ‘semantic content’ is often used as a name for what we are 
calling the explicature – the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance (or speech 
act). The pragmaticist claim is that free enrichment contributes to explicature. But it is 
quite clear in the pragmaticist literature that it does not contribute to semantics as used in a 
different sense, that is, as the component of the grammar that maps linguistic forms to 
encoded meanings.
25
 We agree with Martí that free enrichment is not part of the kind of 
semantics that could be a component of the grammar – that is, part of a modular linguistic 
competence. It contributes to explicature, but the pragmaticist approach is based on the 
assumption that explicature incorporates much more material than could be considered a 
matter of linguistic semantics. This is precisely why certain pragmaticists have argued 
against equating semantics or semantic content with explicature (see especially Carston 
2008). Martí seems to think that the shared starting point for semanticists and pragmaticists 
includes the assumption that the semantics component of our grammar delivers explicature, 
at least modulo saturation and disambiguation. In fact, however, this is not a shared 
assumption: instead, the truth or falsity of this assumption lies at the very heart of the 
semanticist versus pragmaticist debate. 
 The pragmaticist position, then, is that free enrichment is a pragmatic process, a 
function of a pragmatic performance mechanism, and not a component of a model of 
grammar/linguistic competence. Introducing covert optionals into the grammar might seem 
appealing if the alternative suggestion were to introduce an even more alien process – free 
enrichment – into the grammar. But since we are denying that the pragmatic effects in 
                                                 
25
  See King & Stanley (2005: 111-137) for discussion of these and other construals of the term ‘semantics’. 
33 
 
 
question here are any part of what is derived by the grammar, the advantage that covert 
optionals seem to have in this respect disappears. In the previous section, we argued that 
that they have no role in the process of comprehension. The further point here is that they 
are different from any familiar linguistic phenomena that they may be modelled on. First, 
in the case of overt indexicals, there is no need for any pragmatic process of deciding 
whether or not the indexical is there to saturate: if it is not pronounced, hence audible, it is 
not there. Second, there is the suggestion noted above that the variables are covert 
counterparts of overt adjuncts Martí (2006: 141, 159)). Adjuncts are, by definition, 
optional and since we unarguably have overt adjuncts in the grammar, why not assume 
covert ones as well? The answer is that this would still not give us anything parallel to the 
optionality of these alleged optional covert indexicals, because when a construction to 
which an overt adjunct could be added is tokened, it does not come with a variety of 
logical forms corresponding to all the possible combinations of adjuncts that might be 
attached on different occasions: again, if some possible adjunct is not pronounced, it is not 
there in the sentence uttered. In contrast, it appears that all the various possible 
combinations of covert optionals would have to be tokened so as to be available for testing 
to see if one will prove to be a logical form corresponding to the hypothesized explicature. 
 A third possible way of interpreting Martí’s suggestion is that the choice between 
the two logical forms is a kind of structural disambiguation, which is clearly an 
independently attested phenomenon. But this apparent analogy also fails. In known cases 
of disambiguation, the linguistic system provides two distinct contents and the hearer 
selects one of them (e.g. the well-known case of ‘He saw the spy with the binoculars’). He 
would not arrive at a particular contentful structure without it having been presented as 
such by the grammar as a possibility. In the optional variables case, on the other hand, the 
hearer has first to access or infer a certain content via the context (i.e. pragmatically) and 
34 
 
 
 
 
then choose between two logical forms which differ only with regard to whether or not 
they contain a variable corresponding to one of the constituents of that inferred content. 
 Our general point here is that, once it is recognized that the conception of free 
enrichment used by the pragmaticist is not a grammatical one, the apparent advantage of 
covert optionals (that they are far more like attested components of the grammar than is 
free enrichment) is undermined. Moreover, as we argued in the previous section, positing 
optional covert elements of linguistic structure does not relieve us of the need to appeal to 
free enrichment or something very akin to it. In working out what the correct logical form 
is, the hearer has to recover the propositional content, by a process whose nature remains 
something of a mystery on the covert optional view, but, upon close examination, appears 
to be indistinguishable from free enrichment. This reveals a fatal tension in the semanticist 
approach between wanting to account for the smoothness and rapidity of communication, 
and wanting to maintain as formal a system as possible: the latter does not reflect the 
psychological reality of the comprehension process. 
 Martí insists that she is working on a model of linguistic competence (knowledge), 
so perhaps she would not be troubled by these on-line processing considerations. However, 
she does recognise that the competence representations she proposes (logical forms) must 
be available to the performance systems responsible for utterance comprehension (the 
syntactic parser and the pragmatics system). So, as we discussed in section 4, when she 
comes to give specific ‘derivations’ involving the (alleged) different logical forms for ‘It is 
raining’, she works with specific utterances (tokenings of the sentence type in particular 
contexts) and tries to show that, in certain instances, the indexical-containing logical form 
plays a key role in comprehension thereby obviating the need for free pragmatic 
enrichment. However, if our analysis in section 4 of the comprehension process is correct, 
there is, in fact, no role for a linguistic representation containing a covert location indexical 
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and all the specifically linguistic work of guiding interpretation is done by the simple 
variable-free logical form. This being so, it is difficult to see what is gained by including 
such representations in an account of linguistic competence. While it is a part of our 
linguistic competence that we know that the sentence ‘It is raining’ can be modified by a 
location constituent, this knowledge is simply a consequence of very general grammatical 
principles (of phrase structure) as is our knowledge that ‘It rained/is raining’ (and many 
other sentences) can be modified by a temporal constituent or a manner constituent (e.g. ‘It 
rained constantly and heavily last week’). Such modified structures comprise distinct 
sentence types and no purpose is served by building this sort of knowledge into the 
linguistic representations underlying the simple sentence type ‘It is raining’. In short, even 
if the aim is just to model ‘semantic competence’, leaving aside performance issues, there 
is no role for these covert optional elements. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The primary motivation for positing hidden indexicals (obligatory or optional) is the worry 
about the apparently unsystematic nature of pragmatic enrichment (see especially Stanley 
2007). However, a major challenge for the semanticist is how to account for the optionality 
of many pragmatic contributions to explicature. The proposed solution we have been 
considering here is that these contributions are the values of optional aphonic elements that 
are part of the logical form of the sentence uttered. We have argued that this proposal does 
not work: such elements are redundant as far as the interpretation process is concerned, and 
moreover, have no role in a model of linguistic competence. Recall that the overarching 
goal of both camps in this debate is to explain the generally rapid and effortlessly smooth 
process of grasping an utterance’s truth-conditional content. If our arguments are correct, 
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covert variables have no role in explaining this, and moreover, the optional variety appears 
to introduce additional complexity by requiring an extra process of structural 
disambiguation.  
 A wider point against the overall semanticist strategy is that it is highly improbable 
that free pragmatic enrichment can be entirely dispensed with. For instance, causal 
meanings are frequently inferred, as in the much discussed case of ‘and’-conjunctions such 
as (28), but also in a range of other cases, exemplified by (29)-(31): 
 
28. Amy hit Max and he burst into tears. 
29. The boss fired the employee who was embezzling money. 
30. The drug-addled undergrad fell off the Torrey Pines cliffs. 
     ((29) and (30) taken from Kehler & Rohde 2015) 
31. LGBT couples can be refused service under new Mississippi law.  
      (Headline in The Guardian, 5
th
 April 2016) 
 
In understanding (29), we take it that there is a causal connection between the embezzling 
and the firing, and similar causal connections are inferred in the other examples. These 
causal meanings contribute to explicature (intuitive truth-conditional content), but it would 
be very difficult to make a case that any particular words in these examples contain a 
covert variable that would give rise to this meaning (see also the further range of cases 
discussed in Hall 2008 and Clapp 2012a). The key point here is that, unless all pragmatic 
contributions to explicature/truth-conditional content, other than disambiguation, can be 
plausibly analysed as saturation of (overt or covert) indexicals, the semanticists face 
exactly the same challenge that they issue to the pragmaticist: they need an account of the 
pragmatic constraints that allow some enrichments but exclude others. To conclude, then, 
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covert indexicals play – at most – a minor role in explaining hearers’ grasp of explicature, 
and contributions from free pragmatic enrichment are unavoidable.  
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